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Abstract: When an economy experiences crisis that reduces the level of human capital stock, such a
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In an optimal growth model of human capital evolution this paper shows that cutting down investment
during crisis may not always be the optimal response to crisis.  At certain levels of human capital,
maintaining the pre-crisis level of investment is optimal and may be crucial for economic success.
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2Introduction
In the course of history, various nations of the world have at one time or the other
experienced shocks or crisis situations.  In the last century alone, the great depression
of the 1930s, the oil price shock in the late 1970s and the subsequent foreign debt
crisis that rocked emerging nations come readily to mind.  Common in many of these
situations is the coping strategy employed by the affected countries.  Countries in
crisis situations often cut back on investment and smooth consumption as much as
possible until the crisis subsides.  Although consumption takes some of the impact,
we observe that investment bears the major burden as shown on table 1.
Table 1 - GDP per capita, investment share of GDP, consumption share of GDP
(in 1985 international prices)
Country GDP
Per
Capita
(1979)
Investment
share of
GDP(1979)
Consumption
share of
GDP(1979)
GDP
Per
Capita
(1984)
Investment
share of
GDP(1984)
Consumption
share  of
GDP(1984)
Mexico 17744 19.4 73.8 16837 14.4 72.2
Brazil 11285 21.1 70.8 10478 14.3 75.5
Guatemala 9003 11.0 84.9 7687 7.9 83.0
India 2164 15.3 57.4 2611 12.9 59.6
Philippines 5104 20.5 65.1 4564 15.6 68.2
Egypt 5595 6.5 69.7 6984 6.3 65.6
Nigeria 3483 15.9 46.5 2846 8.7 65.5
Kenya 2198 13.0 67.8 2085 10.8 65.9
*Penn World Table - NBER Web site( www.nber.org)
3The table shows the trend of GDP per capita in constant 1985 U.S. Dollar terms,
Gross investment as a share of GDP, and Gross consumption as a share of GDP for
some of the most heavily indebted countries across the world at the time.  These were
mainly third world countries that had borrowed a lot during the years of the oil price
boom at concession rates of interest.  With the on-set of the oil price shock these
countries were worst hit by the subsequent debt crisis of the mid 1980s.  In the worst
year of the crisis (1984) we see that there were major cuts in investment relative to
1979.  The data suggests that when hit by unexpected shocks, countries tend to reduce
their rate of investment as a coping strategy.  The reason for this is simple: at low
levels of income, consumption is usually at a relatively low level.  When crisis hits,
individuals are often unwilling to take cuts in consumption, other variables especially
investment bear the greater burden of adjustment. Even when the countries involved
are not so poor, for example the Southeast Asian financial crisis in the last couple of
years, we observe that many financial institutions closed down and the cost of credit
went up.  This had a negative effect on the level of investment and aggregate demand.
Ferri and Tae (1999) argue that this over-reaction by financial institution was
responsible for worsening the crisis and if uninterrupted would have plunged the
economies further into depression.
In standard optimal growth models such as the Ramsey-Cass-Koopman model,
optimal investment levels and growth rates can be deduced from the first order
conditions.  Given some initial conditions, the behaviour of the economy can be
mapped out straight away. Built into the model is the premise that output (Y t) is
shared between consumption (Ct) and investment (It), that is  Y t = Ct + It.  Applying
actual data to this framework we see that if a crisis were to reduce Y t, Ct and It would
4also fall.  As can be seen from table 1 above, It would take a greater cut because of the
need to smooth consumption.  The aim of this paper is to determine if this strategy is
optimal for developing economies when faced with shock or crisis situation.  The
crisis could be strictly economic (e.g. resulting from a debt burden, poverty, e.t.c.), or
precipitated by political instability, natural disaster, wars and other factors which
affect a country’s ability to retain or fully utilise its stock of capital.  Is it always the
best thing to cut down on investment?  This paper aims to find an answer to this
question using a simple human capital evolution model.
We begin by describing what a crisis situation is and the possible effect on the level
and evolution of human capital, output and welfare, and we examine the reactions to
economic shocks (section 1).  Using an optimal growth model, we analyse what the
optimal investment strategy should be (section 2).  Based on the relevant equations of
the model we simulate the model behaviour so as to make meaningful deductions
(section 3).  We then present the model results in section 4 and take a closer look at
the implied investment behaviour during crisis.  We show that maintaining the
existing level of human capital is crucial to attaining an economy’s full potential and
conclude that reducing investment when crisis hits is not always the optimal strategy.
1. Economic Crisis and Human Capital Evolution.
Standard of living and welfare are measured by consumption, which is determined by
the level of income.  Income/output levels depend on how much productive resource
an economy has accumulated and how well it uses the resources.  The presence and
quality of human capital applied to physical capital is a major determinant of output
5levels and standards of living.  The effect of crisis on the evolution of human capital is
therefore important.
Standard of living is usually associated with the level of human capital attained.
Robert Lucas (1988) uses this idea in his work.  He modelled the evolution of human
capital both as a function of current investment and the level/quality of human capital
already attained.  The build up of human capital determines the level of output in the
economy and therefore the level of welfare.  There are however special cases where
this does not necessarily hold true.  For example, Russia’s level of human capital is
comparable with levels in western European countries but its standard of living is
much lower and technological development remains well below world standards
(Overland and Spagat, 1996).  The reason for this is not far fetched.  The marginal
product of a well educated labour force working with poor technology and low quality
physical capital will tend to be low.  It may also be that the quality of human capital
may be low such that income will be low, and standard of living poor. The economic
environment is an important factor in determining how well and how quickly human
capital is built up and therefore how higher standards of living can be achieved.  For
example when competitive factor and product markets are absent, there are no
incentives for managerial innovations.  This, together with other factors such as
underdeveloped legal systems, weak property rights, corruption in the civil service and
government, presents a fragile environment that cannot support a competitive market
economy.  The economic environment could be so unhealthy that the productivity of
the people and the skills embodied in them is significantly impaired.
6To deal with the problem and eventually improve the situation we will show that
countries should, in times of crisis, invest to prevent loss of their existing stock of
human capital.  The reverse is however what we have observed.  When the economic
environment is fragile or in crisis, the much-needed investment cannot be easily
attracted from abroad, yet economies reduce their rate of capital investment. This
coupled with already low income in an unfavourable economic environment will have
a negative effect on human capital stock, output, and welfare.  We therefore propose
that reducing investment may not be an optimal strategy because the welfare gain
from sustaining the pre-crisis level could outweigh the gains from smoothing
consumption.
Spagat (1995) with similar concern for Russia and other countries of the former
Soviet Union in his work advocated for early intervention by full investment in human
capital.  In a ‘learning or doing’ type framework, political instability is used to explain
why the environment is not attractive to investment and it is suggested that
maintaining the existing stock of human capital would be a sound policy.  This may
require borrowing since resources are very scarce but such borrowing would be
profitable in the long-run to both the borrower and lender countries.  In this paper,
political instability among other factors precipitates what we call a crisis.  There is no
borrowing but the idea of maintaining the stock is very much at play.  We show that
by systematically investing more units of resources, the problem can be solved as the
economy proceeds on an optimal path.  Murphy, Vishny and Shleifer (1997), with
simultaneous industrialisation of sectors, create a ‘big push’ that shifts the economy
out of the low productivity trap.   Here, we follow a different approach and show that
7each additional unit of capital invested can be viewed as a ‘small push’ towards the
eventual take-off of the economy.
The importance of economic reaction to shocks cannot be overemphasised. Private
individuals as well as corporate investors tend to cut back on investment into human
capital when hit by crisis. UNICEF’s1 (1997) report on the relationship between
education and child labour tells us that unexpected economic downturn is the major
reason for the increasing participation of children in the labour force.  In times of
crisis, children are pulled out of school to work in order to supplement family income.
Very many of them do not return to school as shown by the low completion rates in
most affected countries.  Even when they do return, they lag behind their peers. The
World Bank2 in their report on the social issues arising from the East Asian economic
crisis also say that, “Families tend to withdraw their children from school due to
falling incomes and an inability to pay school fees or other attendant costs (uniforms,
school meals, textbooks, and ‘voluntary contributions,’ for example). Likewise
working age children confront immediate opportunity cost of education versus income
generating activities.”  These represent a decrease in investment in human capital and
a deliberate policy by the government to reduce public investment can only worsen the
situation, and result in significant human capital loss. Thus, the report expressed as
one of its major concerns the need to sustain investment in human capital and to
prevent leakage and efficiency loss.
                                                
1  Also see Basu and Pham.(1988) who proposed that child labour occurs not because
parents are selfish or lazy, but as a result of parental concern for the family’s survival
under conditions of stark poverty.
8It is also not uncommon in crisis situations for trained personnel to emigrate given
half a chance and to find qualified professionals under-employed as they abandon
their professions and take up other vocations.  This could be either because they
cannot find jobs for which they are trained or for example, driving a taxi yields more
total income than practising medicine.  When people do not practice the profession
for which they are trained, the quality of their skills diminishes.  This will have an
adverse effect both on the present and future stock of human capital.  For the present
stock, the rate of depreciation experienced by the economy would conceivably exceed
its natural rate.  This is due to the fact that apart from losses due to death at old age,
retirement and other such factors that constitute the natural rate of depreciation, the
economy could suffer significant losses from emigration of skilled individuals, as was
the case in many developing economies in the 1980s.  Skilled personnel migrated
from the countries worst hit by the oil crisis to countries such as Saudi Arabia and the
United States of America.  The term Brain Drain3 was used to describe their exit
because it represented not just a loss in the present stock of raw labour, but also the
knowledge and skills embodied in them.  The exit of medical personnel, for example,
represented both a loss to the stock of doctors/professors at the time, and an even
greater loss to the next generation of physicians-to-be.
Furthermore, under-employment also became a serious problem.  Professionals left
their jobs or cut back on the number of hours worked.  Many took up other
commercial activities to supplement the income from their professional jobs thus their
                                                                                                                                           
2 The report is a work-in-progress for discussion at a meeting of Development Co-
operation Ministers in Sydney (March 5, 1999).  It is available on the World Bank
website for Social Crisis.
3 Michael P. Todaro.  (1992.  pp. 132-133; 352-354);  Ritterband, Paul.  (1978.  pp.2-4).
9skills could not be fully utilised while they are engaged with other activities.  A
chemical engineer, with all his training will probably not be as productive working as
a security guard as he would be if he were working on an oil rig.  The long run effect
of this trend could be devastating as the gap between actual and natural rate of
depreciation increases over time.
The problem of losing human capital is made more serious if we consider that the loss
may not be temporary, as is the case with conscription into the army for the duration
of a war.  People who emigrate because the environment is not conducive are unlikely
to return unless the situation that precipitated their exit has improved; hence the
situation could well be permanent.  Investing in order to maintain the pre-crisis level
of human capital is important.  We will show that the long run gain outweighs the
short run sacrifice, because investing in human capital would not only maintain the
existing stock, but it would also serve as an additional incentive to preventing
excessive depreciation through underemployment and emigration.  Inevitably, human
capital stock in an improving environment would produce and attract the required
technology.  Hence the investment made can be viewed as an indirect investment in
technological advancement.
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2. Optimal Growth Model
The standard optimal growth model that readily comes to mind is the Ramsey-Cass
Koopman model. A special case of it with a multi-period objective function of
variables subject to a budget constraint (i.e. Dynamic Optimal growth model),
presented by Gregory Chow4 (1997.  pp. 10-12) is followed here.  Using the method
of Lagrange multipliers, the objective function is maximised and the optimal path for
the model is traced by backward induction using the first order condition. The model
has the key implication that consumption is a constant fraction of output.
‘The Gap’ Model
The model follows Chow’s method of dynamic optimisation using Lagrange
multipliers.  It is an optimal growth model focusing on the optimal path of human
capital.  It employs a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to
scale:
Y t = AHt
a  . . . . . . . . . (1)
where 0 < a <1; Y = output; Ht = Human Capital which can be thought of as human
beings (raw labour) and the skills embodied in them. A is a scale parameter
representing the level of technology and we assume that there is no technological
progress.  The time subscript t = 0, 1, . . . , T shows that the model is in discrete time.
For simplicity, physical capital has been normalised to unity, output s therefore a
function of human capital only.  Human capital evolves according to:
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Ht+1 = d_Ht  +  (d¬  -  d_)Htf(It)  + It  . . . . . . . . . . . .(2)
Where d¬ and  d_ are actual and natural depreciation factors respectively (with 0 <  d_
< d¬ < 1) such that    (d¬ - d_)Ht, called ‘the gap’, captures the excess depreciation in
human capital.  When crisis results in the outflow of skilled individuals, or the
inability to fully utilise the skills embodied in human beings, there is an element of
loss that could significantly affect the growth rate and structure of the economy.  In
standard capital evolution equations, losses are viewed as depreciation to existing
stock.  When there is a crisis that wipes out a significant proportion of existing stock
of human capital, depreciation rate would exceed what it ordinarily should be (i.e. its
natural rate), the excess is what we call ‘the gap’.  We will show that the investment
strategy employed in the presence of ‘the gap’ is crucial to economic survival.  The
function f(It), indicates how productive a unit of investment is with respect to ‘the
gap’ and therefore governs its closure.
In the evolution equation, investment directly affects the stock of human capital
through It, and indirectly through f(It) which reduces loss of human capital as ‘the gap’
closes. The function f(It) in equation 2 is defined as:
f(It) = aIt if  0 < It  < I* . . . . . . . . . . . .(3)
        =  1  if  It >= I*
                                                                                                                                           
4 See appendix 2 for further exposition.
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where I* is the minimum investment required to close ‘the gap’ and a = 1/I*.  Once I*
is reached, f(It) becomes unity. The first and second terms on the right hand side of
equation 2 combine and the equation becomes the ‘no gap’ capital evolution equation:
Ht+1 = dHt + It .
This change in behaviour is important because of its implication for the marginal
product of investment with respect to ‘the gap’.   This we define as:
f ` (It)  =  a if 0  < It  < I* . . . . . . . . . . . (4)
          =  0  if It >=  I*
As long as the investment level is below I*, f(It) = aIt,  the derivative (equation 4),
f `(It) = a, will be positive. We will show that this condition holds true when
optimality conditions are satisfied.
Total output in each period is divided between consumption (Ct ) and nvestment(It) -
Y t = Ct + It .   Therefore:
Ct = AHt
a - It. . . . . . . . . . . (5)
Utility derived from consumption is assumed to be a logarithmic function:
U[Ct]  =  åTt=o bt ln[Ct] =  åTt=o bt ln[AHta - It] . . . . . . . . . (6)
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The discount factor 0 < b 1 indicates the intertemporal nature of consumption
choices.  The closer it is to unity the more the agents prefer present to future
consumption.  Given the initial level of human capital, agents choose their
consumption with the aim of maximising their utility over their entire horizon subject
to the constraint presented by the capital evolution equation. The Lagrangian is
therefore given by:
L  =  åTt=o bt ln[AHta - It] - bt+1 lt+1[Ht+1 - d_Ht  -  (d¬  -  d_)Htf(It)  - It] . . . . . . (7)
The first order conditions yield:
I t  = AHt
a   -  1/b lt+1[(d¬  -  d_)Htf `(It) + 1]. . . . . . . . (8)
lt  = a AHta-1/AHta - It  +  b lt+1 [d_  +  (d¬  -  d_)f(It)] . . . . . . . . . (9)
In the final period T, no investment is made i.e IT = 0.  From equation 8:
AHT
a  =  1/(b lT+1) and
lT+1    =  1/(b AHTa)     . . . . . . . . . . . . . (10)
This can be substituted into equation 9:
lT =  a/HT  +  d_/ (AHTa)     . . . . . . . . . (11)
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Equations 8, 9, 11, and the evolution equation can be used to trace the optimal path
for the models variables.  Unlike Chow’s model there are no simple analytical
solutions from which we can make meaningful deductions.  To see clearly what the
models implications are, it was simulated using simple computer programming based
on the relevant equations.  The program was designed to solve the model
incorporating all its features e.g. that below I*, f `(It) = a and investment is determined
by equation 8.  Once I* is reached and the gap closes, f `(It) = 0 and the investment
equation becomes identical to that of the ‘no gap’ model:
I t  = AHt
a   -  1/(b lt+1)     . . . . . . . . . (12)
3. Model Simulation
In keeping with convention, b the discount factor and d¬ the target depreciation factors
were both set equal to 0.95.  The minimum investment required to close ‘the gap’ I* is
assumed to be constant and exogenous.  As a representative case, the exponent on
human capital is set at 0.7.  Recall that human capital here consists of labour and the
skills embodied in them.  Researchers have shown that the exponent on physical
capital is in the region of 0.3.  Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), with their
production function – Yt = AKaHbL1-a-b, estimate that the exponent on the two other
factors in their model Labour (L) and Human capital (H) add up to 0.7 (in the constant
returns to scale framework, the exponents must add up to unity).
In this model, we adopt this value for a as the representative case since labour and
human capital are not separated.  The parameters for the representative case are:
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a =  0.7 b  =  0.95
d¬  =  0.95 d_  =  0.84
Ho  =  10 I*  =  5 A  =  1
As a test for the robustness of the results, the model was simulated for a ranging
between 0.65 and 0.79 and the results qualitatively remained the same.  When  gap
was also varied in magnitude from as small as 0.03 to as large as 0.19 by varying d_
from 0.92 to 0.76, the results did not change qualitatively.  The model results are
therefore robust for any reasonable set of parameter.
4. Results
The simulation shows a distinct difference between ‘the gap’ and the ‘no gap’ model.
Recall that in the ‘no gap’ model, consumption is a constant fraction of output.  For
every level of output, there is a corresponding level of consumption and investment.
Simulating the ‘no gap’ model for various levels of initial human capital yields an
upward sloping straight line showing that the absolute value of investment (Io`)
increases directly with the level of output.  Fig. 1.1 below illustrates this behaviour:
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Fig. 1.1: Human capital and investment levels - the ‘no gap’ model simulation.
*Io` is the predicted investment in the ‘no gap’ model simulation.
 There is a direct relationship between levels of human capital and investment (Io`)
the ‘no gap’ model described by the upward sloping line.  As the level of human
capital increases, the corresponding optimal investment level rises (i.e. for any Ho1 <
Ho2, Io1`  < Io2` ).  At higher levels of human capital, investment levels are always
strictly higher.  In ‘the gap’ model, this not always the case.  From fig. 1.2 below we
see that there is segment of the curve that is flat.  Fig. 1.3 plots both models on the
same set of axis for easy comparison of their behaviour.
Ho vs. Io'(a=0.7. d=0.84, I*=5)
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Fig.1.2:  Human capital and investment levels - ‘The Gap’ model simulation.
(Segment 1:Ho = 0-18; Segment 2:Ho = 19-27; Segment 3:Ho = 28-40)
*See Appendix for numerical results of model simulation.
When It < I*, the marginal product of investment with respect to ‘the gap’ is positive.
Fig.1.3 Human capital and investment levels for ‘The Gap’ and ‘No Gap Models.
(Segment 1:Ho = 0-18; Segment 2:Ho = 19-27; Segment 3:Ho = 28-40)
*Series one(Ho vs Io) represents the ‘the gap’ model and series two(Ho vs Io`) represents ‘no gap’ model.
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From fig.1.3 above we see that it is optimal to invest more factor units than the ‘no
gap’ model implies.  When It = I*, the gap closes, and thereafter the model predicts
levels of investment for which f `(It) = 0 is satisfied.  We observe that from this point
(Ho = 19) the model does not behave in the same way for all levels of human capital.
Increase in human capital does not always increase investment, and the reverse (i.e.
decrease in human capital does not necessarily imply that investment should be
decreased) is also true for a range of values (Ho = 19 to Ho = 27).  At lower levels
(the first segment of the curve) where It < I*, higher human capital implies higher
investment.  At higher levels (the third segment) where It > I*, t  same is true.  In the
middle range (the second segment) where It = I*, this does not hold.
Optimal Investment Strategy during Crisis
In this paper, we describe a crisis as any event be it political, economic or by nature,
that wipes out a significant proportion of the existing human capital stock or impairs
the ability to fully benefit from the built up stock.  The implication of the results
presented above for optimal behaviour during crisis is interesting.  For a country
whose level of human capital attained places it in segment one or three (i.e. poor and
rich countries respectively), when a crisis that wipes out part of human capital stock
hits, cutting back investment to match the new lower level of capital stock will be
optimal.  This behaviour is similar to the ‘no gap’ model.  Comparing the slope of
segments one and three, w  find that segment one is steeper than segment three.
When crisis hits, the model implies that poorer countries would cut down investment
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more than richer countries.  At lower levels of income, consumption is crucial to
survival and hence investment tends to absorb more of the shock than would be the
case if the country were richer.  Table 2 below is a numeric illustration of this
difference.
Table 2.  Change in investment corresponding to 15% cut in human capital
Human Capital
(Ho)
Investment
(Io)
Percentage Change
in investment
Segment 1 16 4.599547
less 15% cut13.6 4.23515 7.9%
Segment 2 26 5
less 15% cut22.1 5 0.0%
Segment 3 36 5.742357
less 15% cut30.6 5.301439 7.7%
In segment two, the behaviour differs from the other segments and the ‘no gap’ model.
Segment two represents a window within which cutting down investment when crisis
hits is not the optimal strategy.  For a country that falls into this range (possibly a
middle income country), the optimal level of investment remains the same even in the
wake of crisis.  From table 2 above we see that in segment two, if a crisis wipes out
15% of human capital, the model predicts that the optimum level of investment should
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remain the same as the pre-crisis level.  Minding ‘the gap’ is crucial to economic
survival. Reducing investment in this range would force the economy to a level that is
incompatible with its level of human capital, and the condition f `(It) = 0 which holds
true at an optimum would be violated.
In segment 3 we observe that although both models use equation 12 to predict the post
gap optimal investment level, Io` > Io > I*.  The difference is not significant but it is
nevertheless interesting to know why Io is not exactly equal to Io`. Both models are
beyond the range where minding ‘the gap’ is crucial but do not predict the same
values for investment.  The reason for this is not far fetched.  L grang  multipliers (l)
give the rate at which the optimal value of the objective function increases per unit
increment in the constraint if appropriate derivatives are defined.   In a dynamic
model, each multiplier contains information for the entire horizon of the economy
(since they are arrived at by backward induction).  In the ‘no gap’ model, there is no
minimum investment necessary because of the gap, therefore as we approach the final
period T, investment can optimally fall below I* without re-opening the gap.  For ‘the
gap’ model this is not the case; in the final period IT = 0 < I* and ‘the gap’ is again
open.  This difference in the experience in the models feeds into each of the
multipliers, hence the multipliers will differ and so will the predicted values of
investment.
An important feature of this model is a, the elasticity of output with respect to
changes in human capital.  We find that the closer it is to unity, the more responsive
output is to changes in human capital stock. Change in human capital stock depends
on investment, therefore every unit of investment is very important.  With a high a,
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output reacts robustly to changes in human capital, and the economy reaches I* faster.
If  a is too low, then output would be inelastic with respect to human capital.  The
returns to additional investment in human capital would be very small and it would
take the economy a much longer time to close the gap.  If this were the case and
especially where resources are very scarce, the cost to of inve ing in human capital
could outweigh the benefit.   Using a realistic value for a is th refore important.
Conclusion
The model as simulated gives useful insights to the qualitative behaviour of
economies in crisis, especially those that are neither rich nor poor.  The key
implication of this model is that for middle income countries, a cut in investment may
not be the optimal strategy when faced by crisis.  Richer economies may optimally do
this but, as we have seen, minding ‘the gap’ makes it sub-optimal for middle income
economies.
An important question, which arises from this implication of the model, is why
economies cut down on investment when hit by crisis if it is not optimal to do so?   A
closer look at some economies that have gone through the different types of crisis
described could perhaps proffer some explanation.   One possible explanation for this
is that the marginal product of human capital could be negative.  This does not
however seem plausible since in reality we do not observe this.  We are then left with
the alternative that the crisis economic environment is not competitive and gives no
incentive to private entrepreneurs to invest in their workers.  It may be the case that at
the national level there are benefits to be reaped in the long run, from investing during
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crisis as we have shown. If the individual entrepreneur who is fundamentally profit
driven can not tap these benefits, then he has no incentive to invest.  If all private
entrepreneurs do not invest, the level of gross investment in the economy will be
affected downwards; hence the behaviour observed from data of gross investment
during crisis.  An investigation into this possibility and how government can stimulate
private investment especially during crisis situations by policy (e.g. tax reductions)
should be (at least) informative and useful for economic policy making. Strategies
employed by some of the East Asian countries (e.g. Thailand where education
spending remained the same as the pre-crisis year level in real terms), suggests that
this is the way to go.
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Appendix 1
Results for model simulation using base line set of parameters.
I*=5 a = 0.7 d_= 0.84
Ho Io Io'
10 3.410182 2.763222
11 3.627548 2.926958
12 3.842024 3.084091
13 4.042063 3.235345
14 4.23515 3.381314
15 4.429934 3.522495
16 4.599547 3.65931
17 4.77078 3.79212
18 4.944629 3.921235
19 5 4.046928
20 5 4.169437
21 5 4.288974
22 5 4.405726
23 5 4.519863
24 5 4.631535
25 5 4.740879
26 5 4.844019
27 5 4.953069
28 5.019258 5.056132
29 5.115029 5.157302
30 5.209064 5.256668
31 5.301439 5.354309
32 5.392475 5.450299
33 5.482125 5.544709
34 5.570283 5.637603
35 5.657009 5.72904
36 5.742357 5.819075
37 5.826377 5.907763
38 5.909118 5.995151
39 5.990625 6.081285
40 6.070939 6.166209
*Io and Io` are the optimal investment level predicted by ‘the gap’ model and the ‘no gap model respectively.
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Appendix 2
Optimal Growth Model
In practice, there are two methods of solving dynamic models namely: Dynamic
Programming and the method of Lagrange Multipliers.  Both method apply optimality
conditions to the objective function in the terminal period and then trace the optimal
path for the model’s variables by backward induction.
Given:Y t  =  ZtKt
a
where t = 0, 1, 2 …, T denotes time;  Y = Output;  Z is a scale parameter for
technology;  K = physical capital (Stock variable).  Assuming total depreciation of
capital in each period, the capital evolution equation is given by:
Kt+1   = ZtKt
a    -  Ct   
where Ct =  Consumption(control variable) in period t.  The equation reads that next
periods capital stock is equal to investment which is the difference between output
and consumption.  Change in capital stock occurs when actual investment exceeds
break-even investment.  However here there is total depreciation so Kt+1 simply equals
investment.     Consumer utility function is assumed to be of the logarithmic form:
åTt=o bt ln(Ct)
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where 0 < b < 1 is a discount factor that captures the intertemporal nature of
consumption choices.  Agents must choose the control variable in order to maximise
their utility subject to the constraint given by the capital evolution equation.  The
objective function is given by:
L  =  åTt=o bt ln(Ct)  -  bt+1 lt+1[Kt+1 - ZtKta    +  Ct ]
The first order conditions with respect to the control and state variables respectively
yield:
1/Ct  =  b lt+1 …………(1)
lt  =  b lt+1 a ZtKta-1   ………….(2)
In the terminal period t = T, no further investment is made therefore consumption
equals total output.  That is,  since IT = 0, CT = ZTKT
a   and KT+1  = 0.  Substituting this
into equation 1 in the final period gives: 1/ bZTKTa  = lT+1.  Substituting into equation
2,  lT  =  b a ZTKTa-1/bZTKTa.  This yields:
lT   =  a/KT …………..(3)
Equations 1 - 3 and the capital evolution equation are used to trace the models optimal
path by backward induction.  When this is done, a pattern emerges such that if we
define T - t = t, we can write:
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Ct = [1 + ba + (ba)2 + . . . . + (ba)t]-1ZtKt .  The denominator is an infinite sum, thus
we can write : Ct = (1 - ba) ZtKt  .    The process also yields:  t  =  [1 + ba + (ba)2 + .
. . . .+ (ba)t]aKt-1.  This also can be written as: lt = (1 - ba)aKt-1.  From these
equations we deduce that the optimum consumption level is a constant fraction of
output (1 - ba).
